The Maghreb, Western Sahara and the European Silence

geopolitics
Andalusia
Maghreb
Western Sahara
European Union
Author

EVP

Published

December 31, 2025

When Europe lowers its voice, the Strait turns up the volume

There are days when Andalusia seems to look south as one looks into a fogged mirror. Not for lack of light, but because of an excess of noise: headlines, summits, solemn declarations… and, amid all that, a very European silence. That silence is not an absence of words, but something worse. It is a way of speaking without saying anything at all.

December 2025 left several clues behind. Not all of them made the front pages, and some arrived disguised as routine diplomacy. Taken together, however, they outline a clear pattern: the Maghreb is being reshaped, while Europe continues to react as if it were still 1995, trapped in the nostalgia of the “Barcelona Process” and its promises of neighbourhood partnership (Real Instituto Elcano).

Thus, Western Sahara has remained unresolved for half a century, but that does not mean it is frozen. It means that it is being resolved through faits accomplis: implicit recognition, economics, security, and diplomatic fatigue.

In November (with a direct echo in December), the Real Instituto Elcano put it bluntly: caught between principles and national interest, Spain has spent years opting for the “lesser evil”, and that logic inevitably ends up becoming routine (Real Instituto Elcano).

Meanwhile, Morocco is consolidating a long-term strategy aimed at turning autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty into the only “realistic” solution. This line has gradually gained support at the UN Security Council and, above all, on the ground: agreements, summits, cooperation, and an international pedagogy of inevitability (Reuters)—a pedagogy eagerly embraced by self-proclaimed progressive politicians (or political hacks) such as Sánchez, Díaz, Maíllo, and others who are doing so much damage.

And here the key concept of this piece emerges: EUROPEAN SILENCE. Because the EU is not absent. It is present… but without a narrative of its own.

The EU as an actor without a narrative

Europe appears to be juggling three issues at once:

  1. Migration control.
  2. Energy and commercial stability.
  3. Security in the southern neighbourhood.

The problem is that these three priorities collide when the Maghreb becomes polarised. And the Maghreb becomes polarised when Western Sahara is used as a master key to align allies, punish dissent, and draw lines of separation—under the absurdity of Spain’s (mis)government.

A clear example of this friction can be found along the migration route. Reuters reported an increase in Algeria’s weight within the western route to Spain (and a shift in trafficking patterns), in a context where cooperation becomes more difficult when foreign policy becomes entangled with Western Sahara (Reuters). Meanwhile, instead of bringing order through a coherent strategy, the EU resorts to “patchwork solutions” (very much in Ursula von der Leyen’s style): trade agreements, legal formulas, and verbal balancing acts. Reuters also reported how the EU and Morocco reached a new trade deal that includes agricultural products originating in Western Sahara, in a context shaped by European judicial constraints regarding its status (Reuters).

Clearly, none of this amounts to strategy. It is merely “kicking the can down the road” in the management of the problem.

December 2025: two signals that should not be ignored

1) Madrid–Rabat: industrial cooperation and Western Sahara as the backdrop

The Spanish–Moroccan summit of 4 December was not just a photo opportunity. Atalayar highlighted the intention to industrialise the relationship, aligning it even with “European industrial policy” and frameworks for productive integration (Atalayar Atalayar). At the same time, Western Sahara re-emerges as an unavoidable chapter, such that—benefiting Pedro Sánchez (Prime Minister of Spain) personally and to the detriment of the Sahrawi people—Spain’s support for Morocco’s autonomy plan has become a structural position that Morocco uses to consolidate its diplomatic architecture.

This leads to the uncomfortable question: is Europe backing this move because it believes in it, or because it has no alternative plan that actually works? (Von der Leyen, meanwhile, seems to be busy with other matters.)

2) Algeria–France: colonial memory as a political weapon (with Western Sahara in the background)

On 24 December, Le Monde reported on Algeria’s legislative shift demanding apologies and reparations from France, in a climate where bilateral tensions have also intensified due to France’s position on Western Sahara (Le Monde.fr). This is not “history”; it is applied geopolitics, through which Algeria reinforces its internal legitimacy and draws an external line. And when Algeria hardens its stance towards France, the echo inevitably reaches Brussels (even if Von der Leyen remains focused elsewhere).

By way of summary: actors and vectors of power

  • Morocco: recognition diplomacy, economics as leverage, security as bargaining chip.
  • Algeria: energy, anti-colonial narrative, regional influence, and support for the Polisario as a balancing instrument.
  • EU: trade, migration, legalism; enormous power, but a fragmented discourse.
  • Spain: hinge and frontier; a pragmatism that yields short-term dividends and leaves medium-term bills unpaid (Real Instituto Elcano).
  • Russia (and other competitors): emerging as players in Africa and in narrative-building, including within the information ecosystem surrounding Western Sahara (Atalayar).

And what about Andalusia? The south that always “pays” before the north

In Andalusia, the Maghreb is not a foreign affair; it is immediate geography.

  • Migration: routes shift and reconfigure (with Algeria gaining weight in the western route), and each adjustment translates into operational, political, and media pressure (Reuters).
  • Real economy: trade, agri-food, logistics, tourism, employment. When the EU opts for silence, what is heard here is friction: bureaucracy, uncertainty, and recurring tensions (Reuters).
  • Security and borders: Western Sahara and the Maghreb also constitute a map of alliances. And the Strait acts as a multiplier: what happens to the south does not take “years” to arrive—it takes weeks.

In fact, Spain’s Ministry of Defence has been stating this clearly, in the language of the state:

“…the Maghreb is a space of opportunities and risks for Spain within the international arena, with direct implications for EU–Maghreb relations” (Ministry of Defence).

How might this situation evolve?

We outline three possible scenarios over the next 12–24 months:

🟢 Scenario 1: Controlled continuity

The EU maintains a pragmatic balance (patches): sectoral agreements, variable migration cooperation, and Western Sahara gradually becomes “depoliticised” through exhaustion.

🟠 Scenario 2: Sustained friction

Algeria hardens its positions (towards France/EU), Morocco accelerates the international normalisation of the autonomy plan, and the EU responds late and divided. The cost is felt in migration, energy, and the political climate.

🔴 Scenario 3: Localised rupture

A crisis episode (migration, diplomatic, or security-related) forces the EU to speak… and to choose. Andalusia once again becomes the thermometer—and the front line.

And through all of this:

Europe remains silent because it does not want to lose (above all, its prime ministers and other figures who live off the system—taxes). But the Maghreb moves on, whether Europe speaks or not.

And in that movement, Andalusia cannot afford the luxury of looking south as if it were an optional chapter—because the “neighbourhood” is not next door: it is right in front of us.


References

(1): https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/comentarios/treinta-anos-del-proceso-de-barcelona-con-pena-y-sin-gloria/?utm_source=chatgpt.com “Treinta años del Proceso de Barcelona, con pena y sin gloria”

(2): https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/entre-los-principios-y-el-interes-nacional-medio-siglo-desde-la-retirada-espanola-del-sahara-occidental/?utm_source=chatgpt.com “medio siglo desde la retirada española del Sáhara …”

(3): https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/morocco-declares-national-holiday-mark-un-resolution-western-sahara-2025-11-04/?utm_source=chatgpt.com “Morocco declares national holiday to mark UN resolution on Western Sahara”

(4): https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/migrant-arrivals-spains-balearics-surge-smugglers-switch-routes-2025-11-13/?utm_source=chatgpt.com “Migrant arrivals in Spain’s Balearics surge as smugglers switch routes”

(5): https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/morocco-eu-reach-new-trade-deal-including-western-sahara-farming-products-2025-10-02/?utm_source=chatgpt.com “Morocco and EU reach new trade deal including Western …”

(6): https://www.atalayar.com/en/articulo/politics/joint-statement-13th-high-level-meeting-between-morocco-and-spain/20251204195424221223.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com “Joint Statement: 13th High-Level Meeting Between …”

(7): https://www.atalayar.com/en/articulo/politics/spain-and-morocco-showcase-their-close-cooperation-in-madrid/20251204150946221217.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com “Spain and Morocco showcase their close cooperation in …”

(8): https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/12/24/algeria-demands-apologies-and-reparations-from-france-for-its-colonial-past_6748813_4.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com “Algeria demands ‘apologies’ and ‘reparations’ from France for its colonial past”

(9): https://www.atalayar.com/en/articulo/politics/russia-africa-and-the-sahara-the-diplomatic-game-that-outmanoeuvred-the-separatists/20251224190000221720.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com “Russia, Africa and the Sahara: the diplomatic game that …”

(10): https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/ieee/el_magreb_oportunidades_y_desafios_para_espana_en_el_nuevo_escenario_internacional?utm_source=chatgpt.com “IEEE. El Magreb: oportunidades y desafíos para España …” Fuente de la imagen de portada: https://elordenmundial.com/ ”

Front image source: https://elordenmundial.com/